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ABSTRACT 
Fault Recovery in Discrete-Event Systems with Intermittent and 
Permanent Failures 
Ganesh Koraginjala 
As systems grow more complex to cater to demanding operational requirements, they 
tend to suffer from increasing component failures. It is important to minimize the effect 
of these failures on the overall performance of these systems. In this thesis, fault 
recovery using discrete event systems theory is studied. 
It is assumed that the plant can be modeled as a finite state automaton, and that is 
prone to failures. For this study all events are assumed observable and the extension to 
the case of partial observation is left for future research. The problem of the synthesis of 
fault recovery procedures is studied. In particular, the cases are studied in which the 
plant may return to normal operation. This could be either because the failures are 
intermittent or because the plant has the capacity to repair or reset. Both of the above 
cases are studied in this thesis. 
It turns out that the problem is an instance of the problem of robust nonblocking 
supervisory control for countably infinite number of plants. The objective of the thesis is 
to obtain maximally permissive solution for the above problem. It is shown that the 
iii 
desired supervisor can be obtained as the maximally permissive solution of a robust 
control problem involving a bounded number of plants. Furthermore, an iterative 
procedure is provided to solve the original problem involving an infinite number of 
plants. The procedure is guaranteed to converge in a bounded number of steps. Several 
examples are provided to illustrate the proposed procedures. 
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As systems grow more complex to cater to demanding operational requirements, they 
suffer from increasing component failures. It is important to minimize the effect of these 
failures on the overall performance of these systems. In this thesis, we study fault 
recovery using discrete event systems theory. We consider a specific case wherein the 
systems are capable of returning to normal operation from failure modes of operation. 
The task of designing and implementing control policies for these large systems under 
various failure scenarios is very complex and computationally expensive. Large 
manufacturing systems, space systems, and communication systems are all examples of 
discrete event systems (DES). A DES model of a spacecraft propulsion system may have 
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millions of states to deal with. Failure scenarios are defined by number of failures, types 
of failures, and times of occurrences of these failures . 
A failure can be an event occurring at any level of system dynamics and cause the 
system to malfunction or show degraded performance or shutdown completely. A failure 
can be permanent or nonpermanent. An example for a permanent failure can be a broken 
shaft in a motor system wherein a nonpermanent failure can be a short circuit in power 
system network. A permanent failure keeps the system in failure mode indefinitely 
whereas a nonpermanent failure keeps the system in failed mode for some duration only 
and then it may disappear. 
These large systems are usually controlled for reasons such as: to 
i. Avoid unwanted behaviour (safety requirements) 
ii. optimize use of resources 
iii. obtain optimum performance 
iv. provide reconfiguration and/or alternative operational paths in case of 
failures 
For example, in a manufacturing system, a controller (supervisor) can be used to 
prevent buffer overflow/underflow. The effect of a controller is, in general, restrictive on 
the system's behaviour. The system or process to be controlled is called the 'plant.' We 
assume that this plant can be modeled as a state machine and that this plant contains finite 
number of states. 
1
 In this thesis, a failure and a fault carry same meaning and are used interchangeably. 
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In DES theory, the events that happen in the plant are represented as symbols and the 
set of all possible sequences of symbols generated by a particular plant is called the 
language of the plant. In the theory of supervisory control of Ramadge- Wonham (RW), a 
DES supervisor is capable of restricting the plant behaviour by restricting the language 
generated by the plant within pre-specified limits. These limits are called specifications 
and are set forth by the safety and performance requirements. 
The following control loop depicts the control structure where the supervisor 5" reads 
the sequence generated by the plant (s = crla2...(Jn) and then enables only events to be 





Fig. 1.1: General control structure for plant G and supervisor S 
In the above control structure, the supervisor S is in a feedback loop with the plant G. 
The supervisor monitors the event dynamics in the plant and then sends commands (in 
terms of enabled events) to the plant to ensure that the plant generates only those event 
strings stipulated by the specifications. 
Generally, the specifications are given in terms of legal and illegal event strings. 
However, it is possible to represent these specifications in terms of safe and unsafe states. 
In that case, the supervisor can work in a state feedback fashion and limits plant 
behaviour only to the safe states stipulated by state specifications. 
A return-to-normal event is defined in the recovery mode of the plant. When this event 
occurs, the plant moves back from recovery mode to normal mode. This event effects the 
dynamics of the plant directly. The plant actually moves from a state in the recovery 
mode states to a state in normal mode states. After moving back to normal states, the 
plant may experience a different settling of normal mode states and exhibit different 
normal behaviour. A simple example is presented in Chapter 3. Designing the DES 
supervisor to effectively implement the control policies considering these changes in 
dynamics is a complicated task. The problem considered in this thesis can be summed up 
as, "Designing a supervisor to control a plant when the plant is capable of returning to 
normal mode from recovery mode." 
The return-to-normal event may occur in two cases. The first is when the failures are 
intermittent and the return-to-normal events correspond to "failure-correct" events. 
"Failure-correct" events are uncontrollable (i.e., can not be disabled or enabled by the 
supervisor). The second case is when the plant has the capacity to either repair the faulty 
components (or replace them) or "reset" itself to normal operation. In this case, return-
to-normal events are "recovery-action" events, and controllable (i.e., can be enabled or 
disabled by the supervisor). Due to the difference in the controllability properties of 
return-to-normal events as mentioned above, the nonblocking specification (i.e., the 
ability to prevent deadlocks and livelocks) of the resulting control problem will be 
different. 
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In the next section, we review some relevant articles in the literature. 
1.2 Literature Review 
There are certain frameworks and techniques used for fault recovery in discrete event 
systems as reported in literature. These frameworks consider permanent failures and do 
not expect the plant to return to normal mode from recovery modes. There were no 
studies reported in open literature about how to compute supervisors for plants which are 
capable of returning to normal modes of operation from recovery modes through well 
defined return-to-normal events. 
In [17], a model-based programming method is provided to perform reconfiguration of 
fault recovery. This method tracks the present state of the system, diagnoses the fault and 
provides reconfiguration. A version of this framework is used in a deep space probe 
(Deep Space One, DS1) by NASA. In this setup, the most likely present state of the plant 
is continuously estimated (by a 'model-based executive,' called Titan). This program, 
then generates a sequence of control actions to move the plant to more desired state 
dictated by specifications. 
In [6], adaptive supervisor synthesis algorithms are presented. The algorithm does two 
parts: learning and repairing. A supervisor is computed that is capable of reconfiguring 
itself in supervising a team of robots. In particular, robots switch offline due to failure 
events and the algorithms learn and repair the supervisor to control the new set of robots. 
When a robot goes offline, the learning algorithm deletes the events which belong to the 
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failed unit alone from the previous supervisor, and then the repair algorithm restores the 
fractured automaton. However, the article does not deal with the case when new units 
dynamically join the team. The authors report this aspect as possible future research. 
In [16], a weaker notion of fault-tolerance is considered to be sufficient in some 
applications. As such, following any fault, the system is guaranteed to reach a recovery 
state from where the subsequent behaviours are subsumed by those that are possible from 
a nonfaulty state. Necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a weakly fault-
tolerant supervisor are given. However, this particular supervisor will not provide a 
viable solution for mission critical applications such as spacecraft. Also, the category of 
applications for which this supervisor can be used effectively is not provided. 
[5] deals with systems particularly with multiple resources failures. This article 
considers supervisory control for deadlock-free resources allocations, in manufacturing 
systems. This reference is of particular interest since, in the setup considered, the 
controller must guarantee that a set of resource failures does not propagate through 
blocking to stall other portions of the system. It is considered in such a way that the plant 
can continue operating without the need for the failed resource. However, it will not be 
the case for many practical applications. Also, a procedure to successfully separate the 
failed resource from the rest of the plant has to be developed. 
In [10], fault recovery problem in discrete event systems is considered. A diagnostic 
system which can detect and isolate the faults with bounded delay is assumed to be 
available. In this framework, the diagnostic system can be designed using any technique 
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as long as the lower and upper bounds of the delay in detecting and isolating the fault are 
available. This improves the flexibility of the design. However, this framework results 
in a more conservative supervisor for the fault recovery. The authors proposed a modular 
switching supervisory scheme. An extension of this framework to timed DES is dealt 
with in [19]. 
[14] mainly deals with the fault recovery in discrete event systems using observer-
based supervisors. A modular switching scheme of supervisors is proposed for fault 
recovery. However, such cases where recovery to normal operation is possible, are not 
considered. Two solutions are provided, one in which the recovery supervisor is in 
feedback loop when the system is started in its normal mode, and another in which the 
recovery supervisor is engaged only when a failure is detected and isolated. 
In [12], the problem from [10] is transformed into an equivalent robust nonblocking 
supervisory control problem under partial observation. A set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the existence of a solution for the fault recovery problem are proposed. In 
this framework, the fault events are unobservable but can be diagnosed. One of the main 
assumptions in this framework is that the exact model of the plant in any of its 
operational mode (normal, transient, and recovery) is known. Here it is assumed the 
faults are permanent and as a result, the corresponding robust control problem involves a 
finite set of plant models (each corresponding to a mode of operation). Here it is 
assumed that the permanent fault occurs once, following which recovery actions are 
taken. 
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In this thesis, we study the problem of fault recovery when return to normal 
operation is possible either because the faults are intermittent or because the plant has the 
capacity of repair or reset. 
1.3 Thesis Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows. 
The problem of fault recovery in DES systems is studied when return to normal 
operation is possible. Return-to-normal can be either because the faults are intermittent 
or because the plant has the capacity to repair or reset. 
We considered two cases of supervisory control problem, one with controllable return-
to-normal (recovery-action) events and the second one with uncontrollable return-to-
normal (fault-correct) events. In each case, the resulting supervisory control problems 
will be instances of Robust Nonblocking Supervisory Control Problem of (countably) 
infinite number of plants. The solution for robust control of finite number of plants is 
given in [2],[13]. Here we extend some of those results to the case of infinite number of 
plant models. Specifically, we looked for the maximally permissive supervisor (i.e., a 
supervisor that does not disable an event unless it has to, in order to meet the design 
specifications). We show that the above optimal (maximally permissive) solution can be 
obtained as the maximally permissive solution of a problem involving a bounded number 
of plants. Furthermore, we propose an iterative procedure for obtaining such solution. 
The procedure is guaranteed to converge in a bounded number of steps. 
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Three case study problems are provided to illustrate the solution procedure. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
In Chapter 2, we review the background material for discrete event systems and few 
concepts used in this thesis. We study robust non-blocking supervisory control problem. 
An example is given to illustrate computation of supervisors in standard (non-robust) 
RW-based procedures. 
Chapter 3 formulates the problem that is studied in this thesis. The problem of finding 
a robust supervisor for failure recovery when the plant is capable of returning to normal 
from recovery modes is given in detail. The significance of the return-to-normal events 
is discussed. 
In Chapter 4, we solve the fault recovery problems posed in Chapter 3. As mentioned 
before, the problems are instances of Robust Nonblocking Supervisory Control of 
countably infinite number of plants. We also propose iterative procedures for solving the 
problems. 
In Chapter 5, three application examples are solved using the design algorithm 
presented. TTCT [15] has been used to carry out the computations. The simplified 
propulsion system (SPS) and extended propulsion system (EPS) have uncontrollable 
return-to-normal events. The automatic resource allocator (ARA) has a controllable 
return-to-normal event. 
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Finally we conclude the thesis with conclusions and future research in Chapter 6. 
1.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, Discrete Event Systems (DES) are introduced and the general nature of 
the problem explained. The existing literature is reviewed. We reviewed the thesis 




Formally, a DES can be considered as a dynamic system equipped with a discrete state 
space and a state transition structure. It is a system that is asynchronous or event driven. 
In this Chapter, we review some basic concepts as well as supervisory control in DES. 
We also review state-based approach in DES and provide an example. 
2.1 Introduction 
A framework to model supervisory controllers for DES was introduced in [18] by 
Ramadge and Wonham. It will be referred to as RW. RW framework is automaton-
based. The following are some salient points of this framework: 
i. The framework proposes procedures that take the finite state automata models of 
the plant and the design specifications and generate control structures, guaranteed 
to satisfy the design specifications and eliminate blockings. 
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ii. Both the plant and controller are treated separately in this framework, 
iii. The framework can characterize the solutions of the control problem in terms of 
naturally definable control concepts and properties, such as controllability, and 
observability. 
One of the challenges that this framework faces is the computational complexity for 
large-scale systems. One way to deal with this complexity is to exploit horizontal and 
vertical modularity. For more details, the reader is referred to [19] and [11]. 
2.2 Automata 
Finite State Automaton 
Consider a plant modeled as a finite state automaton G, with 
G = (Q,lL,8,q0,Qm) 
where Q is the set of states, £ is the event set. 8 is the partial transition function 
S :QXZ —>Q, q0 is the initial state, and Qm c O is the set of marked states. The 
transition function defines how the plant moves from state to state driven by the events. 
The marked states represent those states of plant that are significant for reasons mostly to 
do with plant operation. 
Let Z* denote the set of all sequences of events S and the empty sequence s. A 
language over E is any subset of £*, i.e., an element of the power set Pwr(S*). Then 
the definition includes both the empty language tj>, and E* itself. For language I c E * , 
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L denotes the prefix-closure (or simply closure) of L. L is closed if L = L. For two 
languages I , M c S ' , I i s M-closed if L = L fl M. 
Let Z(G) = {se£* | 5(s,qo)\s defined} be the uncontrolled language generated by G 
over alphabet £ . L(G) represents the set of all possible event sequences that take G from 
the initial state to a reachable state. The set of all possible event sequences which take G 
from the initial state to some marked state in G is represented by Lm(G). While L(G) 
represents the closed behavior of the plant, Lm(G) represents the marked behavior of the 
plant G. 
Synchronous and Parallel Products 
Complex controlled DES are directly modeled as product structures of simpler 
components. Two operations that are often used in modeling the joint operations of DES 
are 'product' and 'Synchronous product.' 
Let Gi and G2 represent two DES with alphabets £1 and £2. In product, the two DES 
synchronize the occurrence of their common events: <x = £iri£2 occurs if it is defined 
and enabled in both G/ and G?. Events that are not in Eif] £2 are disabled. 
In synchronous product, the DES synchronize on the common events (similar to 
product). However, each may execute its own private events without any 
synchronization; that is events in (£1 - £2) and (£2 - £1). The reader is referred to [18] for 
more details. 
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TTCT is a software program that is used for analysis, synthesis, and verification of 
DES and supervisory control in DES. [18] gives us a review of TTCT procedures. 
The TTCT meet procedure computes the reachable part of product of G/ (with event 
set Ei) and G2 (with event set £2) to create G3 with event set £3 = £1 n £2. 
G3 = meet (G/, G2) 
The sync procedure forms the synchronous product of G/ and G2 to create G3. The 
event set of G3 will be £1 u £2. 
G3 = sync (G/, G2) 
Nonblocking Automata 
G is nonblocking if for any string t e L(G), there is at least one string V such that 
ts e Lm(G) . This means that from every reachable state in G, there is a path to a marked 
state. This DES is said to be nonblocking if Lm(G) = L(G), where Lm(G) represents the 
prefix-closure of L,„{G). Alternatively, let R(G) be the set of states of G reachable from 
the initial state go-
R(G)={qeQ\3seL(G), q = S(qQ,s)}. 
The set of coreachable states of G is defined according to 
CR(G)={q^Q\3seZ\ S(q,s)eQJ. 
Thus G is nonblocking if and only if/?(G)c CR(G). 
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2.3 Supervisory Control 
Consider a plant G = (Q,I,,S,q0,Qm). It is assumed that the event set 2 can be 
partitioned into controllable and uncontrollable events, i.e., Z = £t. U£„c. Controllable 
events can be disabled or enabled. In this thesis, we assume all events are observable. 
Let E czQ denote the set of'legal" (safe) states of the plant G. In supervisory control 
theory, we want to design a supervisor S to ensure that the plant never leaves E, and the 
plant under supervision is nonblocking. A supervisor monitors the sequence of 
observable events generated by the plant and restricts the behavior of the plant to the 
"legal" states by disabling and enabling of controllable events. 
The assumption that the specification is given in terms of "legal" (safe) states is not 
limiting. Problems involving "legal event sequences" can be transformed into equivalent 
problems involving "legal" states as specifications by adding suitable automata 
(modifiers) to capture the "history" of event sequences [18]. More detail on modifiers is 
provided at the end of this section. 
Based on s = av...ak <= E* generated by the plant (under supervision), and observed by 
the supervisor, the supervisor can determine the state of the plant. The supervisor can be 
defined as a state-feedback map S : Q —> Y where T := {L' c Z|S' 3 SJ(C}. At a state q, 
S(q) is the set of events enabled by the supervisor. S interacts with G to form the closed-
loop system. The traditional control loop in DES is shown in Fig. 2.1. Note that S only 
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disables controllable events. A supervisor that never disables uncontrollable events is 
called admissible (controllable). 




Fig. 2.1: Traditional control loop 
Let L(S IG) be the language generated by the plant G under supervision of S(S IG), 
and Lm(SIG) be the marked behavior. The closed behavior L(SIG) is defined 
inductively as follows [Wonham]: 
• e&LiSIG) 
• If .v e L(S / G), a£ S(S(q0,s)), and scr e L(G), then sa e L(S IG) 
• No other strings belong to L(S IG). 
We then have L(S IG) c; L(G), and according to the above definition, L(S IG) is 
closed. The marked behavior ofS/G is defined as 
Lin(S/G) = L(S/G)f]Lm(G). 
Thus Lm (SIG) consists of sequences in the marked behavior that can be generated in 
system under supervision. Note that in S/G, marking is still determined by the plant G. 
Abusing the notation, we let R(S/G) and CR(S/G) be the reachable and coreachable 
states of the plant under supervision: 
R{SIG)= {q<EQ\3seL(S/G) : q = S(q0,s)} 
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CR(S/G) = {qeQ\3s,s':seL(S/ G), ss' e L(S IG),q= S(q0, s) and 8{q, s') e Qm } . 
In the supervisory control problem, the objective is to find an admissible supervisor S 
such that 
(i) R(S/G)^E; 
(ii) R(S/G) c CR(S/G). 
The former condition confines G stay inside the set of desirable states, and the 
latter ensures that S/G is nonblocking. Assuming such S exists, then R(S/G) is a 
controllable, nonblocking predicate, and vice versa, if a subset of E that is 
controllable and nonblocking exists, then the supervisory control problem is 
solvable [18]. 
A supervisor S is maximally permissive (optimal) if it only disables an event 
when it has to. Note that in the case of full observation as in this thesis, we can 
always construct an optimal supervisor [5]. However, an optimal supervisor may 
not exist for the case of control under partial observation. 
The supervisory control problem discussed earlier is referred as "state-based" 
supervisory control problem since the design specification is given in terms of safe 
(legal) states (E). An alternative, equivalent formulation of the supervisory 
control problem follows a linguistic approach in which the design specification is 
given in terms of a legal language (i.e., legal event sequences). 
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The solutions to the linguistic supervisory control problem can be characterized 
in terms of controllable and Lm(G) -closed languages. 
Definition 2.3.1. [11] A language K is called controllable with respect to the plant G if 
KXucf)L(G)^K 
In the linguistic approach, the supervisor is considered as a map S : S* —» T . 
Let EczLm(G) be the legal language (design specification). The supervisory control 
under partial observation is to find an admissible supervisor such that 
Lm (5 / G) c £ (S/G satisfies E) 
L^(S IG) = L(S IG) (nonblocking condition). 
It can be shown that [8], [4] for K cz E, there exists an admissible supervisor S such 
that 
(i) Lm(S/G) = K 
(ii)Z~(S IG) = L{SIG) 
If and only if 
K is controllable and Lm(G) -closed. 
Thus the class of controllable and Lm{G)-closed languages characterizes the set of 
solutions to the supervisory control problem. 
Using state-modifiers, any language-based supervisory control problem can, without 
any loss of generality, be converted into a state-based problem. 
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State-Modifiers 
A state-modifier refines the state transition graph of the plant so that event sequences 
leading to every state are either all legal or all illegal, creating a partition of states into 
safe and unsafe states. 
We compute the modifiers from their respective mode specifications models. To 
compute a modifier, the following steps have to be followed: 
1. Take the final specification for a given mode; 
2. Add a dump state to it and connect each state in the plant with the dump state 
using event transitions that are not defined at that particular state in the plant; 
3. Finally, mark the dump state. 
The plant transition structure can be modified by using the meet function from TTCT 
[15] 
Modified Plant = meet(plant, state-modifier) 
The next section shows an example of supervisory control. 
Example 
Let us consider the following plant model: 
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Fig. 2.2: Plant Model 
The plant has 5 states and 9 event transitions. Event cros is an uncontrollable event and 
rest of the events are all controllable events. Throughout this thesis, marked states are 
shown with an outgoing arrow. Also controllable events are crossed (^z>). It can be 
seen that states 0 and 4 are marked. Let E be the state-based specification denoting state 
2 as the unsafe state. We construct the supervisor as follows. 
State 2 can be reached from states 1 and 3 through the event transitions an and<T32. The 
supervisor disables these two events resulting in the following model: 
Fig. 2.3: Partial model of the supervisor 
It can be seen from Fig. 2.3 that the state 2 became unreachable. The following model 
shows the model for the supervisor with state 2 removed: 
20 
Fig. 2.4: Partial model of the supervisor 
It can be seen that the above model shows state 4 as unreachable. Further, we need to 
remove state 4 and event a40 resulting in the following model: 
OOl 
<a (D 
Fig. 2.5: Partial model for the supervisor 
The above model shows all reachable states; however, we face the problem of blocking in 
this model. Once the plant reaches state 1, it is blocked. To solve this problem, we need 
to disable event croiand remove state 1 as well. The following model shows the final 
supervisor S: 
G30 
Fig. 2.6: Supervisor S 
The above design procedure can be done in a systematic way [18]. 
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2.4 Robust Supervisory Control 
In this thesis, we study fault recovery problems in cases where return-to-normal operation 
after a fault is possible. As we will see in Chapter 3, the problem will become an 
instance of robust control of an infinite number of plants. Here we review some relevant 
results from literature on robust control of finite number of plants. 
Consider a finite set of plants G,,...,Gn, each a finite-state automaton 
n 
G, = (£>,,£,, Si,q0 ,Qm ) . Let E, c Lm(G,) be a set of legal languages. Let E = US,• It is 
( = 1 
assumed that the plant models agree on controllability of events. That is a e E, H 2y is 
controllable if only if a is controllable in both G, and G, and otherwise it is 
uncontrollable in both G, and Gy. The Robust Nonblocking Supervisory Control Problem 
is find a supervisor S such that 
(i) A„(S/G,)<=£, 
( i i ) Z > / G , ) = L(S/G,) 
Let G be a finite state automaton with Z,(G) = U£(G,) and L (G) = U L (G(). Also 
i=\ i=l 
define £ = f l ^ U (Z* - 4, (3))) D 4, (G) • 
7 = 1 
Then 5 solves the robust nonblocking supervisory control problem if and only if there 
exists K^E such that [1], [13]: 
1. K is controllable with respect to G 
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2. AT is Lm(G) -closed 
3. Kis G, -nonblocking (Kf]Lm(G,) = Kf]L(G,)) 
The following two lemmas will be useful. 
Lemma 1. [13] Suppose G\ and Gi are DES over the alphabet £ with 
£(G,)c L(G2) . For a supervisor S: 
L(S/Gi) = L(S/G2)f)L(Gl). 
Lemma 2. [1] Suppose G\ and Gi are DES over the alphabet £ with L(GX) c L(G2) and 
Lm (G,) c Lm (G2) . For a supervisor 5: 
4,(5/G1) = im(1s/G2)nA„(G l). 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented various details about Discrete Event Systems relevant to this 
thesis. We explained concepts such as supervisory control and robust supervisory 




In this chapter, we formulate the supervisory control problem for failure recovery when 
the plant can return to normal mode from recovery modes. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
return-to-normal is possible in case where either the failure is intermittent or some 
mechanism exists to fully repair (replace) the faulty components. The general structure 
of the plant to be controlled is described in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, the problem 
statement is established. A mathematical example is presented in Section 3.4. 
3.1 Introduction 
In complex control systems that comprise thousands of components, design and 
implementation of control policies become extremely difficulty to manage. This is partly 
due to the large size of the problems. For example, let us consider a spacecraft. The task 
at hand is to design control policies that will successfully launch the spacecraft into a 
particular orbit. This example is considered in detail in [17]. As an example consider a 
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spacecraft containing one science camera, and two twin engines. One of the design 
specifications could be: 
"Heat up both engines (standby mode). Meanwhile, turn the camera off, 
in order to avoid plume contamination. When both tasks are 
accomplished, thrust one of the two engines, using other engine as backup 
in case of primaiy engine failure" 
The control policy required to achieve this specification must be able to turn on various 
heating elements, valve drives, open sets of valves and record and interpret various 
sensor readings often in a predefined order. This spacecraft, as a discrete-event plant 
would have millions of states, and a very large set of design specifications. Designing 
and implementing supervisory control policies for this set up would be complex. 
In addition to the intrinsic complexity posed by the large number of components, many 
components are prone to failures. An example of a failure is for an inlet valve to a 
particular engine becoming stuck-closed, and consequently, the task of firing and 
achieving thrust from that particular engine becomes impossible. Supervising a complex 
system such as a spacecraft with possible component failures poses considerable 
difficulties in developing control policies. As a result, the development of systematic 
methods for control systems has been the subject of extensive research. 
Generally, failures can be permanent or intermittent. A valve becoming stuck-
closed could be an example of permanent failure and an electronic circuit becoming open 
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as a result of heating and high temperature is an example of intermittent failure. 
Depending on the severity of failures, the plant either can recover (through repair or 
replacement of faulty components) or continue to function at lower performance or can 
be completely shut down (for safety reasons). 
In this thesis, we study fault recovery in systems that can be modeled as Discrete-
Event Systems (DES). In a DES framework, occurrences of failures are modeled by 
(uncontrollable) failure events. We assume that a fault diagnosis system is available to 
detect and isolate the faults and report them to the supervising control system. The 
combination of plant and diagnoser system can be regarded to be in one of the three 
different modes: 1) Normal mode, 2) Transient mode, and 3) Recovery mode. As 
depicted in Fig. 3.1, the system initiates in normal mode. Once a failure event occurs, the 
system enters into the transient mode before the failure is detected by the diagnosis 









Fig. 3.1: Different modes of the system (plant and diagnoser) 
The responsibility of a DES supervisor is to ensure that the plant works in accordance 
with pre-determined set of design specifications (concerned with the safety of the entities 
involved such as the equipment, personnel, and environment). These specifications 
26 
normally restrict the plant behaviour in all three modes. A supervisor should ensure that 
the plant adheres to these specifications both in normal, transient, and recovery modes. 
As an example, let us consider a fuel pump system feeding a furnace, which has two 
primary pipes (PI, P2) and one auxiliary pipe (AUX). The system also has valves to 
shut/open the flow and individual sensors to read the flow rate in each pipe. Let us 
assume another flow meter reads the fuel flow rate reaching the furnace. Fig 3.2 below 




- • To Furnace 
AUX 
Fig. 3.2: Furnace System with three pipes 
In normal mode of the operation, both primary pipes allow the fuel flow and the 
auxiliary pipe is used as a backup in case of a failure in any of the primary pipes. For 
simplicity, we assume that the failure can occur only in one pipe at a time. Example 
specification in normal mode for this system would be as following: 
'The flow rate can be between 10-20 seem (seem- Standard 
Cubic Centimetres per Minute).' 
An intermittent failure in this example can be complete blockage in one of the primary 
pipes. This failure is assumed to be detected by a sensor rather quickly. Upon 
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occurrence of this failure, the system enters into recovery mode. The recovery mode 
specifications would be: 
'The flow rate should not fall below 8 seem, if it 
falls below 3 seem; the system has to be shutdown.' 
Recovery mode specifications are generally less restrictive than those of normal mode 
(Here, in terms of required flow rate). If the flow rate falls below 8 seem, the recovery 
action is to open the auxiliary pipe to boost the flow rate. If the flow rate falls below 3 
seem, the system has to be shutdown for safety reasons so not to allow the furnace on 
very low fuel input. When the flow rate falls below 3 seem, opening the auxiliary pipe is 
not an option since the furnace faces dry run conditions and needs to be shutdown before 
restarting again with full flow rate. 
In this thesis, we study the design of supervisory control systems for plants that are 
subject to failures. We assume that the plant may return to normal mode of operation 
either because some of the failures are intermittent or because full repair (or replacement) 
of faulty components is possible. 
Typically some of the events are unobservable, for example, failure events are usually 
unobservable. In this thesis, as a first step towards solving problems involving return-to-
normal events, we will assume for simplicity that all events are observable. The 
assumption of observability of failure events means the diagnosis system can detect and 
isolate failure events before the next event occurs in the plant. The extension of the 
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solutions developed in this thesis to the case of control under partial observation is left 
for future research. 
As a result of the assumption of observability of failure events, the transient mode 
never occurs (Fig.3.1) and after a failure event the system enters the recovery mode. We 
will base our solution on the Ramadge-Wonham (RW) theory of supervisory control. 
Fig. 3.3 shows the control loop in which a plant G is supervised by supervisor S. S 
monitors the events unfolding in the plant and at any given step, based on the sequence 
generated by the plant (s), makes a decision about the disablement and enablement of 




Fig. 3.3: Control loop (G: Plant; S: Supervisor) 
3.2 Plant Model 
We assume that plant G can be modeled as a finite-state automaton 
G = (Q,I,G,SG,q0,Om) where Q represents the set of states and S c represents the set of 
events in the plant. Both the normal and recovery modes are included in this model. 
The set of states can be divided into two main categories — normal, and faulty. The 
states that represent the normal modes of the plant belong to the normal state set, denoted 
by ' QN •' The states that represent the recovery (faulty) modes of the plant belong to the 
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recovery (faulty) state set, denoted by QR and QR = i)QR- The recovery states are 
r=\ 
reached when different failure events occur. Fig. 3.4, below, depicts the state sets, with 
failure event (ft) and return-to-normal (Sn ) events, assuming single failure scenarios (i.e., 
no simultaneous occurrences of failures). Throughout this thesis, we will consider only 
single-failure scenarios. 
QR 
Fig. 3.4: Normal and Recovery state sets 
The event set S c contains two most important event sets: (1) Failure events CZf); and 
(2) Return-to-normal events( S r). A failure event takes the plant from normal mode of 
operation to recovery (failure) mode of operation and is an uncontrollable event. In this 
thesis, all of the events including failure events are assumed to be observable. We 
consider both intermittent and permanent failure events. We define return-to-normal 
events for both kinds of failure events. 
The return-to-normal events are those events that take the plant from recovery modes 
( QR, ) to normal mode of operation ( QN). 
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There are two types of return-to-normal events: (a) Failure-correct events, and 
(b) Recovery-action events. The set of failure-correct events is denoted by E / t . A 
failure-correct event can be understood as an event that models the disappearance of a 
particular intermittent failure. These events are uncontrollable and their occurrence needs 
no intervention from the system, in other words, no action is required that is external to 
the failed component. An example of intermittent failure can be an electronic circuit that 
becomes open-circuit once it heats up. After it becomes open, it cools down, the failure 
disappears and the circuit resumes operation. 
Recovery-action events set is denoted by Era. These are the actions that the plant 
takes (such as repair or replacement of faulty parts) to return to normal mode of 
operation. Opening an auxiliary valve in response to a stuck-closed primary valve is an 
example of a recovery-action event. These events are assumed to be controllable events. 
The disjoint union of S / t and Sra is denoted by Er (E, = S/c L)2ra). £,. denotes the set 
of all return-to-normal events. 
The event set S c can be partitioned into controllable and uncontrollable event sets, i.e. 
SG = Ec c U S G uc . The event set SG can also be expressed as the union of two subsets: 
Ec =E U 2 / 3 where ~Lf- {fv-fp}(p > 1) represents the set of failure events, and Zp 
represents the set of all other plant events (excluding the failure events). Obviously, 
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We finish this section with a note on recovery to normal events. While the 
consequence of a return-to-normal event is mainly the plant moving from recovery mode 
to normal mode, the dynamics of the plant are more affected because of this event. 
Specifically, after a recovery event, the plant may enter a normal state that it would not 
have entered if it had not experienced failure and then recovery. In other words, some 
normal states are only reachable after return-to-normal event. 
To elaborate on this, let us revisit the furnace system we considered in the introduction 
(Section 3.1). In this example, we considered a pump system with two primary pipes and 
an auxiliary pipe. When a failure (blocking of a primary pipe) occurs, the plant enters 
into recovery mode. To enforce the recovery specification, we can open the auxiliary 
pipe. But when the intermittent failure is rectified, i.e., blockage is cleared in the primary 
pipe due to a failure-correct event and when the plant moves back to normal mode, now 
in the normal mode of the plant, all three pipes are in open condition and allowing a flow 
above the level required for the normal operation of the furnace. 
3.3 Problem Statement 
The problem considered in this thesis can be stated as "Designing a supervisor to 
control a plant when the plant might return to normal modes from recovery 
modes." The design of such supervisor has to consider the plant dynamics involved, 
when the plant moves from recovery mode to normal mode. The two main aspects that 
the supervisor has to take into consideration are: 
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a) The plant under supervision has to follow the designated specifications for 
each of the plant modes; and 
b) The plant under supervision should be nonblocking in all of the plant modes. 
Let us elaborate on these two aspects: 
Safety requirements: These requirements ensure that the plant operates safely in all of 
its operational modes. The safety is achieved by restricting the plant behaviours to 
specifications in all modes. The plant initially starts in normal mode. The plant under 
supervision in normal mode should abide by the specifications and should not enter into 
the forbidden states in normal mode. Upon occurrence of a failure, the plant enters into 
recovery (faulty) mode. Consequently, the supervisor must be able to limit the plant state 
only to safe states as per the specifications in recovery mode. Also this supervisor must 
be able to restrict the plant only to safe normal states upon return to normal states from 
recovery mode. 
Nonblocking requirements: The supervisor must be able to control the plant in such a 
way that nonblocking is guaranteed in all the modes. At first, the plant under 
supervision in normal mode should be nonblocking. Upon occurrence of a failure, the 
plant enters into recovery mode. The plant under supervision in this mode should also be 
nonblocking. At this juncture, it is important to note that if a blocking situation in normal 
mode can, subsequently, be cleared only by a failure, the situation in normal mode still 
has to be considered as blocking. This is because we cannot count on a failure to occur to 
come out of blocking. Similarly, when the plant is in recovery mode, if only an 
uncontrollable return-to-normal event (failure-correct event) can clear any existing 
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blocking, the situation has to be considered as blocking, since uncontrollable return-to-
normal events in the case of intermittent failures are not guaranteed to occur and should 
not be relied on for getting out of deadlocks and livelocks. 
The controllability nature of return-to-normal events in a mode / presents us with two 
cases: 
Case 1: The return-to-normal event set E„ contains only failure-correct events, 
i.e.,Sn =S/c.;Ero. =</>. (Here S/c. and Era are the failure-correct and recovery-
action event sets in mode i) 
Case 2: The return-to-normal event set Zr. contains only recovery-action events, 
Cases in which Sn includes both failure-correct and recovery-action events can 
be dealt with using a modified version of case 2. 
The need to enforce the nonblocking conditions in every recovery mode depends on 
whether the mode belongs to case 1 or 2. In case 1, since the return-to-normal events set 
only contains the failure-correct events and by definition these events are uncontrollable, 
the nonblocking requirement has to be enforced in every recovery mode of the plant. On 
the other hand, in case 2 problems the return-to-normal events set contains a few 
recovery-action events, which are controllable. In this case, the nonblocking requirement 
does not have to be enforced as the recovery-action events can be controlled and be made 
to occur to bring the plant from the recovery mode to normal mode. 
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Let us assume for now that the plant has a single failure mode with one failure event 
(p = 1). The extension of results to arbitrary p will be discussed later. Fig 3.5 below 
depicts both modes of the plant: 
Failure events 
Normal "\ /^Recover^ 
(N) 1 \^^ 
Return-to-normal 
events (r) 
Fig. 3.5: Plant G assuming one failure mode (p = 1) 
The plant initially starts in normal mode. In this mode, all of the components exhibit 
normal behaviour of operation. When the failure event (/) occurs, the plant enters into 
failure (recovery) mode (state set QR). The algorithm that is proposed in Chapter 4 is 
capable of computing a supervisor for a given single-failure mode. However, a given 
plant may have multiple failure modes. The algorithm proposed in Chapter 4 can be 
extended to tackle these more complex problems. 
As discussed, the plant continuously moves between normal modes and recovery 
modes as failure events and return-to-normal events occur. In order to state the control 
problem, let us consider the unraveled, expanded state transition graph of the plant G, 









< GNR • 
•^ GNRN • 
Fig. 3.6: Expanded transition graph Gex 
In this figure, ()v,and QRi(i = 0,1,...) denote the set of normal and recovery (faulty) 
states reached after the /' return-to-normal event. Gv and GNR are the subautomata 
containing states QNQ and QN0UQRfi- G(m),N and G(m),+] are the subautomata 
containing states U(QN.J\JQR,J)\JQNJ and \J(QN.J\JQK,J) (»' = 0,1,2,..). 
./=1 y=l 
To construct the automaton Gex in Fig.3.6, formally, we can proceed as follows. First 
introduce a counter for return-to-normal events (and failure events) as shown in Fig. 3.7. 
Let us call the counter C. Then Gex can be formed as the product of G and C: 
Gex = meet (G,C) 
with QN,=QN x {/} and QRJ =QRx{i'} 
Similarly, subautomata of Gex, namely, G ,• and G ,+, (/' = 0,1,...) can be formed 
using the product of G and subautomata of C containing states {0,0',..../} and 
{0,0',...//}. 
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2-{Ef} E-{Sr} S-{Zf} S-{Sr} I-{Ir} 2-{Zf} 
^ o v-uro^urrv^rio rrv^ ,• 
Fig. 3.7: Expanded states showing the events counter 
With the notation given, we present the mathematical definitions for the two cases 1 
and 2 discussed earlier. Let EN cz QN and ER cz QR be the set of legal states in normal 
and recovery (faulty) modes (design specifications). The first problem, wherein the 
return-to-normal events are uncontrollable (only failure-correct events Z / c ) can, 
mathematically, be defined as follows: 
"Design a supervisor S such that 
a) R(S/GN)czEN0 
/ normal mode; 
b) R(S/GN)czCR(S/GN) 
after a failure event: 
a) R(S/Gm)nQROcERO . 
/ recovery mode; 
b)R(S/Gm)czCR(S/GNR) 
after a return-to-normal event: 
a) R(S/GNRN)nQNAcENj x 
i normal mode; 
b)R(S/GNRN)czCR(S/G 
NUN ) 
after another failure: 
a) R(S I Gmw) n Q c ER 
) recovery mode; 
b) R(S/GNRm)c:CR(S/Gmm) 
and so on. More compactly, for / > 0, we want the following: 
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\ recovery mode. 
In the above description, R(S/GN) is the reachable part of the plant under supervision in 
normal mode; CR(S/GN) is the co-reachable part of the plant under supervision. 
ENj = ENx{i} represents the normal mode legal states after the in return-to-normal event 
(after one failure event). Similarly, ER, = ERx{i} represents the recovery mode legal 
states after i'h return-to-normal event and (/"+/)' failure event. The mathematical 
description of the problem presents us with two sets of conditions. The first set, set 'a' 
conditions, restrict the reachable part of the plant under supervision in normal and 
recovery modes to the respective state specifications, thus ensuring safety in all modes. 
The second set, set 'b ' conditions, enforce nonblocking by ensuring that the reachable 
part of the plant under supervision is also co-reachable, so that the plant under 
supervision can reach a marked state from any state in all modes. 
The above description represents the problem when the return-to-normal events are 
uncontrollable ( £ r = £/L.). When some of the return-to-normal events are controllable, 
i.e., Era = 2,.;!)^. * </>, we do not enforce the nonblocking requirements in recovery modes 
since we can enable the return-to-normal events and expect the plant to be able to move 
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to normal mode. So the problem deals with the enforcing of both safety and nonblocking 
requirements in normal modes and only safety requirements in recovery modes. The 
following is the mathematical description: 
"Design a supervisor S such that 
a)R(S/GN)czEN0 
) normal mode; 
b) R(S/GN)QCR(S/GN) 
after a failure event: 
a) R(S/ Gm )nQRfic, ERfi } recovery mode; 
after a return-to-normal event: 
a) R(S/GNRN)nQNl^ENl 
) normal mode; 
b)R{SIGNRN)^CR{SI 
after another failure: 
a) R{S I Gmm)r\QRX^EKX } recovery mode; 
and so on. Alternatively, for / > 0, 




a') R(S/G(m)M)nQRj^ERi } recovery mode. 
We can see the problems in both cases 1 and 2 are instance of the robust control problem 
for an infinite number of plant models GN ,Gm,GNIiN , In the following Chapter, we 
offer solutions for the problems. 
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3.4 Example 
Let us consider the following example to illustrate the details of the problem. Fig. 3.8, 
below, shows the DES model of a plant (G) that contains both failure events and return-
to-normal events. Here both failure events (/) and return-to-normal events (r) are 
uncontrollable and assumed to be observable. 
Fig. 3.8: Plant (G) 
The plant G is prone to failure at state 1. The return-to-normal event is defined both at 
state 4 and 7. The following state sets show us both the safe state specifications and plant 
states for both the normal and recovery modes: The unsafe states are shown in bold. 
EN= {0,1,3}, QN ={0.1.2.3}; 
ER = {4,6,7}, QR = {4,5,6,7}; 
The above problem is solved based on standard (non-robust) supervisory problems and 
the plant under supervision (S/G) is shown below in Fig. 3.9. 
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Fig. 3.9: Plant under supervision of a standard supervisor (Ssi/G) 
It appears that the plant under supervision is nonblocking. However, note that at the 
recovery (faulty) state 7, to reach a marked state (0 or 6) the occurrence of failure-correct 
event r is necessary. The return-to-normal event is uncontrollable and uncontrollable 
events are not be guaranteed to occur. Thus state 7 should be considered as deadlock. So 
the solution based on standard supervisory methods does not provide nonblocking 
guarantee. That is because, in computing this solution, the standard methods did not 
consider the actual dynamics of the plant with respect to the uncontrollable failure-correct 
events. Fig. 3.10 below presents the plant under supervision as per the robust control 
solution computed based on the algorithm presented in Chapter 4. 
Fig. 3.10: Plant under supervision of a robust supervisor (SRobus/G) 
It can be seen that our solution actually provides a robust supervisor which guarantees 
nonblocking both in recovery and normal modes of the plant operation. This plant 
observes no blocking after return to normal mode of operation under supervision by 
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disabling the controllable transition from state 4 to state 7. The complete solution to this 
example is presented in Chapter 4. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the problem of fault recovery when return to normal operation is possible, 
is formulated. We presented two cases of the problems considered. In Chapter 4, we 
present the solution along with the design algorithm. 
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Chapter 4 
Solution to Fault Recovery Problem 
In this Chapter, we will present a solution to the fault recovery problem and then develop 
a computational procedure. The problem formulation is reviewed and some useful 
definitions are introduced in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, the solution for finding an 
optimal (maximally permissive) solution is presented. Section 4.3 develops a 
computational algorithm and provides an example. 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, a supervisory control problem with return-to-normal events was presented. 
Depending on the controllability of re turn-to-normal events, we identified two cases: 
1) Return-to-normal events are failure-correct events and thus uncontrollable: 
Sr = S/c c Suc. This is the case we encounter in dealing with intermittent 
failures, and 
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2) return-to-normal events are recovery action events and assumed controllable: 
We saw that the above problems are instances of robust control problem. In this 
Chapter, we present a solution for the first problem. The solution for the second problem 
is similar and omitted for brevity. Therefore, from now on, we will assume 
Sr = "Lfc c Y.uc. In Chapter 3, the statement of the problem was given in terms of 
subautomata of the expanded plant Gex. If the total number of fault and return-to-normal 
returns cycles is finite, then G^will have a finite state set and the problem posed in 
Chapter 3 will be a robust control problem involving a finite number of automata. The 
solution to this problem (at least in a linguistic setup) is available [13]. Therefore, in this 
chapter, we will assume that an unbounded number of fault and return-to-normal returns 
cycles is possible in the plant (in the case of intermittent failures that is typically the 
case). As a result, we have to solve a robust control problem with an infinite number of 
plant models. 




We refer to the following problem as the Infinite Horizon (IH) problem. We will show 
that the optimal (maximally permissive) solution to the IH problem can be obtained as the 
limit of the sequence formed from solutions to the following Finite Horizon problems. 
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Finite-Horizon-/ (FH1) problem: Find a supervisor S such that for 0 < / < / 
a)R{SJG(m),N)^QNjc:ENj 
b)R(S/G(^,^CR^S,G,^^ 
and for 0 < / < / - 1 
' b') R(S/G
 M)czCR(S/G ,+1) 
'
 v
 (/«<) ' — v (NR)'+l ' 





b')R(S/G ,+i)czCR(S/G iH) 
FH1 considers / cylces of fault and return-to-normal events whereas FH1' considers / such 
cycles and the'(/+1)' failure. From now on, for convenience we use Gt and Gr to denote 
G , and G .... 
(NK)1 N (:V«) 
4.2 Maximally Permissive Solution 
In this section, we show that the infinite horizon problem has a maximally permissive 
solution in the form of state feedback. Furthermore, this solution can be obtained as the 
limit of maximally permissive state feedback solutions for the finite horizon problem (as 
the length of horizon increases). We will show that the aforementioned sequence 
terminates in a bounded number of steps. 
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We begin by exploring some of the properties of the solutions of IH problem. 
Proposition 4.1. A supervisor S solves IH problem if and only if S solves FH1 and FH1' 
problems for / = 0,1,2, 
Proof follows immediately from the statement of IH, FH1 and FH1' problems. The 
following lemmas state that legal sublanguages that posses the three conditions of 
controllability, Lm(G) -closure and G -nonblocking characterize the solutions of IH 
problem (this is similar to the case of finite number of plants in [12]). 
Lemma 4.2. Let S be a solution of IH problem. Then K = Lm (SIG) will be 
1. controllable with respect to G 
2. Lm(G) - closed 
3. G, -nonblocking and Gr nonblocking for all /" = 0,1,2,.... 
Proof: Define K, = L,„(S IG,) and Kr = Lm (SI Gr) for / > 0 . From lemma [1], 
K^KHL^G,) and Kr = Kf]Lm(S /Gr). Also note that LW(GJ = Lm(G) and 
L(Gex) = L(G). 
By Prop.4.1, S is a solution of FH1 and FH1' ( />0) . Therefore, K, (resp.K,.) is 
controllable with respect to Gt (resp. Gr), Lm(G,) -closed (resp. Lm(Gr)-closed) and G,-
nonblocking (Gr-nonblocking). Using the above, we can show K = \J(K,{jKr) is 
/=0 
controllable with respect to G, Lm (G) -closed and G, -nonblocking and Gr -nonblocking 
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(/ > 0). The proof is identical to that provided in part (2) of the proof of Thm. 9 of [13]. 
The proof given in [13] is for a finite number of plant models but all of derivations hold 
for a countably infinite number of plants. • 
Lemma 4.3. Let K cz Lm(G) and K^(/> be a sublanguage of Lm(G) containing legal 
strings for IH problem. If K has the following properties 
1. K is controllable with respect to G 
2. K is Lm (G) -closed 
3. A: is G.m),N -nonblocking and G(m)M -nonblocking (i = 0,1,..) 
Then there exists a supervisor S that solves IH problem with K cz Lm (SIG). 
Proof: It follows from (1) and (2) that there exists a supervisor S such that K = Lm(S IG) 
and Z j S / G) = 1(5 / G). We show S solves FH1 (/ > 0). 
First note that 
Lm(S/G,) = Lm(S/G)nLm(Gl) 
- K(Um(G,) 
Thus Lm(S IGt) contains legal strings ofLm{Gt) . Regarding nonblocking property 
LmiSIG,) = Lm(S/G)nLm(Gl) (By Lemma [1]) 





Therefore S solves FH1. Similarly, S solves FH1', and then by Prop. 4.1, 5* solves IH 
problem. • 
Since controllability, Lm(G) -closure and G -nonblocking properties are closed under 
union operation ([19],[13]), then assuming IH is solvable, it has a maximally permissive 
solution. 
Proposition 4.4. If the infinite horizon (IH) problem has a solution, then it has a 
maximally permissive solution. 
Proof. Follows from lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 and that controllability, Lm(G) -closure and G -
nonblocking properties are closed under union operation. a 
Consider FH1 problem. This is a control problem formalized in a state-based 
framework. The solution of this problem [19] is a state feedbacks': Q, —> T . Each state 
Qi is a pair (q,i) with q e Q is the state of plant, / the number of failure and return-to-
normal cycles (0 < / < / ) . Similarly, the solutions to FH1' are of the form S : Qr —» Y 
with Qr consisting of pairs (qj1) with q eQ and 0 < /" < / . The next result shows that 
even though the feedback law for FH1 and FH1' depend on q and /, the feedback law for 
the maximally permissive solution for the infinite horizon (IH) problem depends only on 
q (not /). This result resembles the control law in Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) 
problem in which the solution for finite time horizon depends on the state and time but 
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the solution for infinite horizon problem depends on state only. In the following, the 
state feedbacks with domain Q (the state set of G) designated by V to differentiate them 
from S whose domain is subsets of Qex (the state set of Gex). 
Proposition 4.5. If IH problem has a solution, then the maximally permissive solution 
will be a state feedback law V* : Q -> T = (S'l E' =3 Z, \. In other words, if S* : Q,r -» T 
denotes the maximally permissive solution, then Sl((q,i)) = V^(q). 
Proof: We have to show that for two states (q, i) and (q, j) the control patterns for the 
maximally permissive solution, that is S*M((q,i)) and Sl((q,j)) are the same. Since the 
design specifications for IH are in state-based form, at any given state {q, i), the control 
pattern only depends on the subautomaton of Gex reachable from the state (q, i). Now 
note that the subautomata reachable from (q, i) and (q, j) are isomorphic. Furthermore, 
the states of the above mentioned can be related by the following isomorphism which 
preserves the legality and the original label of the state from rj((q',k)) = {q ,k + j - / ) . 
Therefore, S*x ((q, i)) = S*x ((q, j)) . • 
Loosely speaking, the control action in IH problem depends on the possible future 
behaviors of the plant and not on how many times in the past the fault and return-to-
normal cycle has occurred. 
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Now that it is established that the desired maximally permissive supervisor is in the 
form of a state feedback law V*: Q —> F , let us study the subsets of the solutions of FH1 
and FH1' that have the same form. So let 
Vi = { V : Q -> r | F solves FH1}; 
Vv = { V : Q -> T | Vsolves FH1'}; 
^4 ={V:Q->r\ V solves IH}. 
The next proposition shows that Vi and V? (if nonempty) posses maximally permissive 
elements. Note that if IH is solvable, then V'x exists (by Prop. 4.4 and 4.5) and therefore 
l4a^ <j> and Vi and Vi< are nonempty (by Prop. 4.1). 
Another important issue is that the total number of state feedback controllers 
V:Q—>F is less than or equal to |(?|x2'~c' since at any state q, there are at most 2 ' 
possibilities for the enablement of controllable events. Therefore |V/ |, |V/'|, \Vro\ 
<\Q\.^. 
Proposition 4.6. If V/ (resp. V^) is nonempty, then it has a maximally permissive 
* * 
element % (resp. %•). 
Proof: Consider two supervisors V^ ,V2 e %. Without any loss of generality we assume 
that 
V,\q) = Zuc for qtRtf/G,) 
Vl2(q) = ZiicforqtR(Vl2/G,) 
50 
This means that the supervisor F/fresp. V2) disables all events at states that can not be 
reached under its supervision. We can assume this without loss of generality since it does 
not affect the closed-loop systems V,11G, and V,11G,. 
Now define the merger of V,1 and V2 according to: 
V, = merge (V^V'y.Q^T 
It follows from the above definition that R(V, IG,) = R{V' I G,){JR(V21G,) and more 
generally, R(V, IG,.) = R(V, IG,) U R(V21G,) for 0 < / < / , and 
R(V,/Gr) = R(V,1 /G,)UR(V2 /G.) for 0 < / < / - l . Since V* and V2 solve FH1, then 
R(V,[/G,), R{V2IG,) and R(V,1 /G,,), R(V21G,,) are controllable, nonblocking 
predicates [19]. Therefore, R(V, /G,)(0 <i < / ) and R(V, /G,)(0 <i < / - l ) are 
controllable and nonblocking. Therefore V, e Vi. Now let V* be the merger of all 
elements of V/. It immediately follows that Vt will be a maximally permissive state 
feedback of the form V : Q —> V . The proposition can be similarly proved for V*. n 
The next result shows how IH problem can be obtained by solving a finite horizon 
problem. 
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Theorem. 4.1: For / > \Q\ - 1 , V' = V^ and V', = V%„ . 
Proof: Since 14 c Vi, we only need to show V' e 14> (i.e., V* solves IH problem). 
Since R(V' / G) cz Q, V* IG will have at most \Q\ states. Therefore , every state in 
Vj IG can be reached by a sequence of a length less than \Q\. Therefore, with in /-l 
fault and return-to-normal cycles all of the reachable states of the plant i?(l^ IG) can be 
visited once. In other words, for every q e R(V* IG), there exists 0<j<l such that 
{q, j) e R(V* IG,) . Since V* solves FHl, then all states (q,j)eR(V*/Gl) and therefore 
all q G R(V* IG) or equivalently all (q,i) e R(V* I Gex) must be legal (and satisfie the (a) 
specifications in IH problem). Since V* solves FHl, R{yl IG;) is a nonblocking predicte 
for 0 < / < / , a n d s o i s R(V' IGf) for 0 < / < / - l . 
Now consider R(V* IG,) with / > / , and (q,k)e R(V' IG,) . If (q,k)e R{V* IG,), 
then as mentioned above it must be coreachable using a sequence through legal states. If 
(q,k)eR(V* /G,), then k>l + l. But there exist (q,j), 0<j<l such that 
(q.j) e R(V* IG,). Since V' solves FHl, then there exists a sequence in Gs starting from 
(q,j), consisting of legal states, and leading to a marked state: 
(qj) -> (?p/i) -> {q2J2) -> i.q„Ja) w i t h q„ e S,„ • Since V* is a state feedback law 
based on q only, therefore the following sequence of legal states also exists in 
V]' IG,:{q,k)^{q[,j{ + k-j)^(q1,j2+k-j)^....->{qllJll+k-j). Thus 
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R(V* IG,) is nonblocking. Similarly, R(V* IG.,) is nonblocking. Therefore V* solves 
IH problem. Similarly, we can show V*. solves IH problem. a 
Based on the above results, instead of finding a maximally permissive solution to IH 
problem, we can find maximally permissive state feedback solutions FH1 or FH1' for 
/ > \Q\ - 1 . The set of state feedback solutions for FH1 (resp. FH1'), 9/ (resp. Vi) are finite 
sets and can be searched recursively for desired maximally permissive answer. Note that 
G/ contains (in the worst case) (/ + l)|g| states. So for / = | (? | -1, G, will have in the 
worst case \Q\~ states. Instead of solving FH1 (for / >|£>j-l), we can obtain maximally 
permissive sequence of solutions (for FHO, FHO', FH1, FH1',....): V^ ,VQ. ,VX' ,Vy , We 
know for / > \Q\ - 1 , V* = V', =V^. It is possible that the sequence terminates faster. So 
if for 0 < k < \Q\ - 1 , V*k = V*k,, (or V*k = Kj_iy), then the sequence has possibly terminated. 
To check this, we obtain R(Vk IG) and if for every qeR(Vk/G), there exists 
{q,i) G R(Vk I Gk), then, similar to the discussion in the proof of Thm. 4.1., Vk* = V^ and 
the sequence has terminated. In practice, k would be as small as 1. In the next section, 
we will discuss a simple example. 
Remark: In our discussion, in this section, we assumed the plant has one failure mode (p 
= 1). The discussion and solution can be extended to the case of plants with more than 
one failure mode (p > 1). Assuming, single-failure scenario (i.e., one failure at a time), as 
shown in Fig. 3.4., the problem and solution will be similar except that G, as introduced 
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in Sec. 4.1, correspond to the plant model with / cycles of fault and return-to-normal 
events, covering sequences of/ faults from the set fault events lLf ={fl,---fp} • Gr is 
defined similarly. To solve the IH problem, we can construct the sequence of solutions to 
FH0,FH0', ...:V;,v;X>K> 
4.3 Example 
In the previous section, we arrived at an algorithm for obtaining a maximally permissive 
solution for IH problem. The algorithm consists of constructing the sequence of 
maximally permissive state-feedback solutions for FH1 and FH1': Vl,V*,, F,*, F,*, If 
for some k, Vk=V'k,, (or Vk =V*k_u) and R(V* IG) = {q\(q,i) e R(Vk I Gk) for some 
0 < / < k or (q, i') e R(V* I Gk) for some 0 < / < k -1} then Vk = V*x . The convergence is 
guaranteed for k = \Q\ -1. 
In the following, we consider a simple example. In Chap. 5 a more detailed example 
will be discussed. 
Consider the plant G given in Fig.4.xl. 
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Fig. 4.xl: PlantG 
Note that only few transitions are labeled with the corresponding events that matter 
most to the discussion. The unsafe states are bolded. 
In G\ the normal states are QN = {0, 1, 2, 3}, and the faulty (recovery) states QR = 
{4, 5, 6, 7}. Suppose states 2 and 5 are the unsafe (illegal) states. Therefore, 
EN ={0,1,3}; ER ={4,6,7}. 
Also note the QR = {0, 6} are the marked states. 
We would like to solve the IH problem. First we solve FHO for GM = Go shown in Fig. 
4.x2, with £„0={(0,0),(1,0)}. 
Fig. 4.x2: GN = G0 
By inspection, we see that disabling controllable event a at state (0,0) will solve the 
problem. Therefore, the following state feedback law will be a maximally permissive 
solution: 
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{ E-{a} q = 0 VQ (q) = ~) S otherwise 
Next we solve FHO' for GNR = G0' (Fig. 4.x3), with ER0 = {(4,0'),(6,0'),(7,0')}. 
*( 4,0' ) 7^ *i 6,0' 
To avoid entering illegal states (2,0) and (5,0'), events a at (0,0) and/5 at (4,0') must be 
disabled. Also, by inspection the deadlock state (7,0') should be avoided and thus a at 
(4,0') has to be disabled. Hence a maximally permissive state feedback supervisor is: 
{ £-{«} V0,(q)=-) ! -{« , /?} q = 0 q = A 
otherwise 
Note that V0, is more restrictive than VQ 
Next we solve FH1 for G (NR)N G, (Fig. 4.x4) 
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Fig. 4.x4: GmjN = G/ 
To avoid entering illegal states (2,0), (5,0') and (2,1), a has to be disabled at q = 0 and 
P should be disabled at q = 4. Furthermore to prevent entering (7,0') which is a deadlock 
state for G^R = Go; a should be disabled at 4. Thus a maximally permissive solution will 
be 
K(q) = 
( -2-{«} g = 0 
q = 4 
otherwise 
r* -r r* We note that V0, = V{ . In Fig. 4.x5 and 4.x6, the closed-loop systems Vl IG and 
Vx I Gx are shown. 
Fig. 4.x5: System under supervision V* IG 
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Fig.4.x6: Vl'/Gl 
We note that R{V* IG) = {0,1,3,4,6} 
= { q\(q,i) e ^ ' / G , ) for z = 0, l}U 
{qliqMeRtf/GJ}. 
As in all supervisory control problems, the automaton in Fig. 4.x5 can be used as an 
implementation of the supervisor as well. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, an iterative solution for the problem considered in Chapter 3 is presented. 
The solution has been found to be converging (in a bounded number of steps) providing a 




In this chapter, we consider three physical examples and solve them using the algorithm 
proposed in Chapter 4. We consider a Simplified Propulsion System (SPS) in Section 
5.2. In Section 5.3, we solve an extended version of SPS: Extended Propulsion System 
(EPS). In Section 5.4, we solve Automatic Resource Allocator (ARA) problem. 
5.1 Introduction 
Discrete Event Systems theory lends itself as a better tool to solve the higher level 
supervisory control problems. One of the prominent areas where DES is used is 
spacecraft systems. [17] deals with few aspects of DES applications to robotic space 
explorers. 
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Three physical examples are considered in this Chapter: i) Simplified Propulsion 
System (SPS), ii) Extended Propulsion System (EPS), and iii) Automatic Resource 
Allocator (ARA). The plant dynamics for the propulsion system examples are taken from 
actual propulsion systems used in spacecraft [5, page: 129]. The dynamics for the 
component interaction is taken from their operational characteristics from real propulsion 
systems. [7] is referred for constructing some of the operational procedures considered 
for the examples. [13, page: 164] describes various steps that are involved in operating a 
spacecraft propulsion system. These steps are considered in designing the event 
sequences for our propulsion system examples. In both propulsion system examples, the 
return-to-normal events are uncontrollable events. 
The third physical example considered is an automatic resource allocator, which can 
resemble any system with two users and two resources. In this example, the return-to-
normal event is a controllable event. Also the solution can be extended to multiple users/ 
multiple resources systems. 
5.2 Simplified Propulsion System (SPS) 
In this example, we consider a spacecraft propulsion system in its simplified version. An 
extended version is considered in section 5.4. We call this simplified version: SPS. SPS 
represents a miniature version of a large spacecraft propulsion system such as the one 
used in Galileo spacecraft [3]. SPS is a mono-propellant system. Spacecraft propulsion 
systems produce the thrust required to accomplish tasks such as controlling the direction 
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of the spacecraft, inserting the spacecraft into orbit and for reactive control systems 
(RCS) of spacecraft [17]. 
5.2.1 Setup of SPS 
The simplified propulsion system (SPS) contains the following components: 
1) Pilot: To initiate start and stop commands to start and stop the whole operation. 
2) Pyro-valve: A pyro-valve is a regular valve operated using pyro (temperature) 
techniques. Also a pyro-valve can only be operated once. The pyro-valve in SPS 
is initially open and is closed to stop the flow of the propellant when required. 
3) Valve: A regular valve which can be opened or closed to control the flow of the 
propellant to the engine. 
4) Thrust Engine: An engine that burns the propellant and produces thrust. 
The following diagram shows the setup of the components for SPS: 
°M o Pyrovalve 
Regular Valve 
Engine 
Fig. 5.1: Setup for SPS 
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Note that the diagram does not include the pilot. The normal operation of the plant is 
as follows: initially the pyro-valve is open and the regular valve is closed and the engine 
is off. Upon receiving a start command from the pilot, the regular valve is opened to 
allow the propellant to reach the engine. Subsequently, the engine is turned on by 
starting the pre-heating and ignition processes. We consider all the steps involved in 
turning the engine on as one event. In this state the plant generates thrust. Once the 
desired mission is accomplished, the pilot sends a stop command. Upon receiving that 
command, the regular valve is closed followed by turning off the engine. The pyro-valve 
is not operated in the normal mode of the operation. 
The failure event (/) is defined as the regular valve getting stuck in open position thus 
creating a situation where the propellant is allowed to reach the engine continuously. 
When this event occurs, the plant enters into failure mode which is also recovery mode. 
In this mode of operation, the propulsion system keeps producing the thrust even after a 
stop command is received from the pilot. We define a return-to-normal (failure-correct) 
event (r) which can bring the failed valve back into normal state (open position) from 
where it can be closed when a stop command is received from the pilot. Both the failure 
and failure-correct events are considered to be uncontrollable as the supervisor has no 
control over them. However, if this failure-correct event does not happen, we provide an 
alternative way to stop the flow of the propellant when the stop command is received. 
We use the pyro-valve to close the flow path for the propellant and then subsequently 
turn the engine off. However, once the pyro-valve is closed, the plant is not reusable. In 
propulsion systems used in spacecraft, usually, multitudes of SPS are used to create 
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sufficient redundancy in the mission operation. The next section presents the DES 
models for individual components and then plant models are computed. A more complex 
problem is studied in Section 5.3. 
5.2.2 DES Models 
In our modeling of the components of the simplified spacecraft propulsion system, we 
consider the general dynamics of the components and their interaction taken from the 
operational specifications of real spacecraft propulsion systems [3],[7],[9]. The 
following remarks apply to all DES models in this chapter: 
1) Uncontrollable events are even numbered; 
2) Controllable events are odd numbered. 























Valve stuck open (failure event) 
Valve closes (failure-correct) 
Return-to-normal event (r) 
Pyro-valve closes 
Start command from the pilot 
Turns the engine on 
Stop command from the pilot 
Turns the engine off 
Table 5.1: Event list for SPS 
The following diagram shows the model for the regular valve and includes the failure 
and return-to-normal (failure-correct) events. 
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1 : V_open : Opens the valve 
2 : Vfail : Valve fails stuck open 
3 : Vclose : Closes the valve 
4 : Vreturn : Valve returns-to-normal state 
Fig. 5.2: Valve (SPS) (Full Mode) 
The valve is prone to failure in its open position (at state 1) leading to failed state 2. At 
this state, the return-to-normal event (4) is defined. This event returns the failed valve to 
normal open position (state 1). When the failure event occurs in the valve, the plant 
enters into recovery mode and returns to normal mode when the return-to-normal event 
occurs. As stated before, the failure and return-to-normal (failure-correct) events are 
uncontrollable. 
The following diagram shows the model for the pilot with uncontrollable events: 6 and 
8. Due to its nature, the pilot is not controlled by the supervisor. Event 6 is a start 
command to start the whole operation while event 8 is a stop command to signal 
completion of the operation and initiate shutting down the propulsion system. 
6,8 
6 : Start: Start command from the pilot 
8 : Stop : Stop command from the pilot 
Fig. 5.3: Pilot (SPS) 
The next model represents the pyro-valve with a single event: 5. The pyro-valve is 
initially open and event 5 closes the pyro-valve. This operation is irreversible as pyro-
valves can only be operated once. 
<rp 
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0 ") ^ •( l \—y 5 : PV_close : Closes the pyrovalve 
Fig. 5.4: Pyro-valve (SPS) 
The model for the engine is given next. Events 7 and 9 turn the engine on and off 
respectively. This is a very simplified model of a real engine used in propulsion systems. 
7 : E o n : Turns the engine on 
9 : E_off: Turns the engine off 
Fig. 5.5: Engine (SPS) 
5.2.3 Plant Models 
We use TTCT [15] to compute the plant model as shown in Fig 5.6 below. States 0 and 8 
are marked corresponding to states when SPS is off. At state 0, engine is off, regular 
valve is closed and pyro-valve is open. At 2, engine is off and both regular and pyro-
valves are closed, and at 8, engine is off, regular valve is stuck-open but the pyro-valve is 
closed 
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This plant model GL represents the full model of plant including both the normal 
mode as well as the recovery mode. The subscript letters denote the modes of operation 
(N: Normal, R: Recovery) and the superscript L denotes the linguistic nature of this 
model. It is possible to deduct the plant in normal mode only by removing the failure, 
return-to-normal events and the faulty (recovery) states. The model of plant in normal 
mode corresponds to the subautomaton of GL containing states {0,1,2,3,5,6,7,10}. 
These linguistic based plant models are converted into state based models in Section 
5.2.5. 
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5.2.4 State Specifications 
First, we define the recovery mode specifications and subsequently deduce the normal 
mode specifications. We present the specifications in simple linguistic sequences. This 
simplifies the understanding of the restrictions on the plant behaviour. However, we 
present DES models for these specifications in state-based models as explained in 
Chapter 4. The following list outlines the normal mode specifications: 
Ni) The operation starts when the pilot gives a start command, pyro-valve is open, 
and the engine is off. 
Nii) The regular valve is opened before the engine is turned on. 
Niii) The termination of the operation is initiated by stop command from the pilot and 
when the engine is on. 
Niv) The valve is closed before the engine is turned off. 
Nv) Pyro-valve should not be used in normal mode. 
The following represent the specifications for recovery mode operation: 
Ri) The termination of the operation is initiated by stop command from the pilot and 
when the engine is on. 
Rii) The pyro-valve is closed before the engine is turned off. 
The DES model SPEC for both normal and recovery mode specifications is shown in 
Fig. 5.7 below. 
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Fig. 5.7: SPEC: Specifications (SPS) 
Note that at state 8 in SPEC, if the return-to-normal event (4) does not occur, then the 
pyro-valve is closed. However, this action renders SPS not reusable. 
5.2.5 Plant Modifiers 
The plant modifier can be obtained by converting specification model SPEC to an 
automaton with a total transition function. This is done by adding a marked dump state 
'd' to SPEC and adding the transitions from all states to the dump state so that the 
resulting automaton has a total transition. We use TTCT [15] to carry the computations 
and the following formula is used: 
Modifier = {Mark the additional state of [Complement of (Complement of 
(Specification model))]}. 
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5.2.6 Modified Plant Models 
First, we modify the plant model in normal mode. We use TTCT [15] to do the following 
operation to find the new model: 
GN = Meet (G'N , Modifier); 
GN represents the state based plant model for normal mode. The following diagram 
shows the state based plant model in normal mode. The states of GN axe of form (q, q') 
with q being a state of G'N and q' a state of modifier. If q' = d (dump state) then (q, q') is 
an illegal state. Therefore, EN = {(0,0),(0,1),(1,2),(6,3),(6,4),(3,5)}. The states of GN are 
renamed and shown in Fig. 5.8b. 
Fig. 5.8a: GN (State-based plant in normal mode) 
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Fig. 5.8b: G,v (States renamed) 
We compute the state based plant model in recovery mode using similar procedure. 
We use TTCT to meet the plant in linguistic model in recovery mode and the modifier. 
The resulting model: G is shown in Fig. 5.9 below. The model G contains 25 states and 
175 transitions! Note that only partial model is shown with important states named. 
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( ! ) 
Fig. 5.9: Partial model for G 
5.2.7 Supervisors 
Following our algorithm presented in Chapter 4, we compute the sequence of supervisors 
V'0,v;,... forSPS. 
The following diagram shows the supervisor: VQ . 
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M 4 
Fig. 5.10: Supervisor: V* 












Fig. 5.11: Supervisor: V*w 
Next, we find V* which is shown in Fig. 5.12. 
4-
6,8 
It can be observed that repeat occurrences of the failure event or return-to-normal 
event do not add any new states to the plant model. Hence, the iteration of computing 
72 
supervisors (as per algorithm in Chapter 4) can be stopped here. Hence Vx = Vx and 
convergence is achieved. 
Fig. 5.12: Supervisor V* 
The actions of the supervisor V*x can be summarized as follows. During the normal 
operation, it only uses the regular valve (with the appropriate sequence). In case of 
failure, if by the time stop command is issued, the failure persists, it will shutdown the 
engine indefinitely following the proper sequence. In the next section, we present an 
extended version of SPS. The Extended Propulsion System (EPS) also contains a 
controllable return-to-normal event and more plant dynamics involved. 
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5.3 Extended Propulsion System (EPS) 
In this example, we consider the extended version of simplified spacecraft propulsion 
system (SPS). This extended example represents a more realistic model of spacecraft 
propulsion systems. EPS is a bi-propellant system. The system uses Liquid Oxygen 
(LOX) along with the main propellant. This example also represents a system wherein 
return-to-normal event is an uncontrollable event (failure-correct). 
5.3.1 Setup of EPS 
The Extended Propulsion System (EPS) contains the following components: 
1) Pilot: To initiate start and stop commands to start and stop the individual 
operations involving individual engines. There are two sets of pilot 
commands in the system for the two engines. 
2) Valves: Regular valves to control the flow of the propellants to the engines. 
There are five valves used in EPS. One of them is used as a backup valve 
which is initially open. All the other valves are initially closed. 
3) Thrust Engines: Two thrust engines to produce required thrust are used in 
EPS. These two engines are capable of producing thrust in opposite 
directions. Initially the engines are in off position. 
The following diagram shows the setup of the components of EPS: 
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Subsytem I f LOX J ( FUEL J Subsytem II 
V : Valve; BV : Backup valve (initially open); E : Engine 
Fig. 5.13: Setup for EPS 
The setup diagram does not show the pilot. Also the fuel tanks are not part of DES 
modeling in the solution presented. Valves, VI and V2 are used to control the propellant 
flow to engine, El. Backup valve, BV is used as a backup for VI. Valves, V3 and V4 
control the propellant flow to engine, E2. Both the engines are setup in such a way that 
they produce thrust in the opposite directions. Both engines are used to accelerate or 
decelerate. If El is used to accelerate then E2 can be used to decelerate in the same 
direction and vice versa. Both engines are not used simultaneously but used alternatively 
to cancel excessive thrust in the directions the engines are setup to produce thrust. 
The normal operation of the plant is similar to that of SPS. Each engine is operated in 
similar way. Upon receiving the start command from the pilot, the valves are opened 
leading to that particular engine. Subsequently, that particular engine is turned on to start 
producing thrust. At the discretion of the pilot, depending on need for decelerating the 
first engine that is producing the thrust is stopped and the second engine is started. 
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A failure event stuck-open is assumed for VI in open position. In this situation, engine 
El gets continuous supply of LOX even after the stop command is issued by the pilot. 
This situation creates potential depletion of LOX. Also when it is time to run E2, there 
will not be enough pressure in LOX supply due to depletion. The return-to-normal event 
is defined for VI to come out of the failure mode back to normal mode and to be closed 
subsequently if necessary. In the case that the return-to-normal event does not happen, 
the backup valve is used to stop the flow of the LOX. Once the valve V1 returns to 
normal mode and subsequently closed, the backup valve (BV) can be returned to its 
normal open position. The major difference in SPS and EPS is that in SPS, once the 
pyro-valve is closed, the plant can not be reused; whereas in EPS, the system is reusable. 
The next section presents all the DES models for all the components in EPS. 
5.3.2 DES Models 
In modeling of these components, we use the same procedures used in SPS. The 
































Valve 1 opens 
Valve 1 stuck open (failure event) 
Valve 1 closes 
VI Return-to-normal event (r) 
Backup valve closes 
Start command from the pilot for engine 1 
Backup valve opens 
Stop command from the pilot for engine 1 
Valve2 opens 
Start command from the pilot for engine 2 
Valve2 closes 


















Engine 1 turns on 
Engine 1 turns off 
Engine2 turns on 
Engine2 turns off 
Table 5.2: Event list for EPS 
The following diagram shows the model for the pilot: 
6,8,10,12 
Fig. 5.14: Model for pilot (EPS) 
The pilot may issue start and stop commands to both engine subsystems. The models 
for all the valves are shown in the following diagram: 
Fig. 5.15: Models for all valves (EPS) 
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All the valves share similar states either open or close except for V1, which is prone to 
failure and has an additional state: fail. 
The following schematic shows the models for both engines: El and E2: 
Fig. 5.16: Engine models (EPS) 
5.3.3 Plant Models 
We use TTCT [15] to compute the plant models. Plant in normal mode comes out to 
have 64 states and 1024 event transitions. Due its large size, the plant model is not 
shown here. Similarly, the plant in its full mode comes out to have 192 states and 3456 
event transitions. It is observed that those states are marked in which the EPS engines do 
not generate thrust. The plant in its full mode is not shown here. 
5.3.4 State Specifications 
The specifications are presented in simple linguistic sequences. The specifications deal 
with the steps to be followed in operating EPS. The following list outlines the 
specifications for normal mode of operation: 
(i) Each subsystem is operated only after receiving a start command from the 
pilot. 
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(ii) The valves that allow LOX have to be opened first before opening the 
valves that allow the fuel. 
(iii) Before starting an engine, the corresponding valves must be open. 
(iv) Before shutting down the engine, the corresponding valves must be closed. 
(v) The following combination of valves can not be in open position 
simultaneously: 
a. VI and V3; and V2 and V4 (These combinations will cause depletion of 
the propellants). 
(vi) Both engines must not be on simultaneously. 
The following DES models present the required state models to implement the above 
normal mode specifications. SPEC1 and 2 model (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv). SPEC3 and 4 






















Fig. 5.17: SPEC1 (Normal mode) (EPS) 
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6,8,12 6,8,10,12 6,8,10,12 6,8,10,12 
1,3,9 1,3,9 1,3,9 1,3,9 













Fig 5.18: SPEC2 (Normal mode) (EPS) 
£-{1,3,13,15 £-0,3,13,15} 
Fig. 5.19: SPEC3 (Normal mode) (EPS) 
£-{9,11,17,19} £-{9,11,17,19} £-{9,11,17,19} 
Fig. 5.20: SPEC4 (Normal mode) (EPS) 
£-{21,23,25,27} £-{21,23,25,27} £-{21,23,25,27} 
Fig. 5.21: SPEC5 (Normal mode) (EPS) 
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The recovery specifications are related to VI. VI is prone to failure. A return-to-
normal event is also defined for VI. In the case, where stop command has been issued by 
pilot but the return-to-normal event has not happened, the backup valve (BV) is used to 
close the propellant flow as required. 
The following list outlines the additional specifications required for recovery mode of 
EPS. Note that all normal mode specifications still apply to recovery mode 
specifications. 
i) When VI fails, the backup valve is used to stop the fuel flow when it is time 
to close the valve after receiving a stop command, 
ii) The backup valve can be reopened once the return-to-normal event happens 
and the V1 is closed. 
The following diagram shows the modified specification to control El considering the 
failure and return-to-normal events for VI: 
*selfloop {10,12,13,15,17,19,25,27} for 
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A suitable supervisor is computed to control the plant under consideration. Our 
solution particularly tackles a situation which is normally not tackled by standard RW-
based solutions. For example, let us consider the plant in recovery mode. State 0 is the 
initial state of the plant where all the components are at their initial states. State 8 
represents the state where all components are at their initial states except VI. VI is in its 
failed position at state 8. The plant is not producing any thrust at this state. The 
following is a partial extract from the plant which includes the recovery mode: 
8 
Fig. 5.23: Extract from G (Plant in recovery mode: EPS) 
The state that has to be considered is state 34. At this state, the subsystem has received 
stop command and the fuel valve, V2 is closed. Now is the time to close the valve, VI 
which has already failed. At this stage, we expect the return-to-normal event to occur. 
However, it is not guaranteed that this event will occur. Also state 34 is not marked and 
the plant can not stay at this state indefinitely where the engine is not off. At this state, 
standard (non-robust) solutions depend upon the return-to-normal event and expect to 
solve the problem. However, for practical reasons, a solution can not depend on this 
event and hence our solution points to the necessity of an alternative way, in this case, a 
backup valve to solve the problem. 
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In the two examples considered so far, the return-to-normal events are failure-correct 
events and controllable. The next example Automatic Resource Allocator (ARA) 
contains a recovery-action event as return-to-normal event and it is uncontrollable. 
5.4 Automatic Resource Allocator (ARA) 
In this example, we consider an automatic resource allocator, which supervises the 
allocation of given resources. In this example, the return-to-normal event (r) is a 
controllable event as opposed to SPS in the previous section. For simplicity, we consider 
two users, two resources in the plant. This plant can represent two computers as two 
users and two parallel processors as two resources. 
5.4.1 Setup of ARA 
The following schematic shows the setup for ARA. 
Rl R2 
B 
Fig. 5.24: Setup for ARA 
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The ARA consists of two users, user A and user B, and two resources, Rl and R2. We 
assume that there is a task allocator which allocates tasks to user A and user B. The 
resources are allocated as per the availability. ARA does not store any data to save the 
queuing of the tasks. Both users A and B need both resources to finish any given task. 
The normal mode operation of the plant is as follows: Depending upon task 
assignment, either user A or user B may acquire either resource. Then the same user 
should acquire the second resource to be able to finish the task. Completion of a task by 
a particular user will release both resources thus enabling another task to be initiated by 
either user. The different states of a user are i) Idle, ii) wait, and iii) busy. At the wait 
state, the user has acquired one resource and ready to acquire the second resource to 
finish the task. The busy state represents where the user is busy finishing the task before 
releasing both resources. Each resource can be in two different states i) Available; and ii) 
Unavailable. 
The problem the plant may face in normal mode operation is of 'mutual exclusion.' In 
this scenario, each user acquires one resource and waits to acquire the second resource. 
Since the second resource is already acquired by the other user, this scenario can continue 
indefinitely. The plant observes deadlock in this scenario. 
The plant enters into failure (recovery) mode, when user A observes a failure. The 
failure event (f) is defined for user A, as user A malfunctions after acquiring either one 
resource or both resources. This event makes the user A unable to finish the task at hand. 
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At this state, we define a controllable return-to-normal event (r) on user A. This return-
to-normal event is a reset action on user A, which resets user A to its initial state. This 
reset action also makes user A to release the resource(s) at hand. We assume that the rest 
of the components work without any failures. Since this return-to-normal event is 
defined as a controllable event, we assume that the event will eventually occur and bring 
user A back to normal operation thus bringing the plant back to normal operation. 
However, as we see in Section 5.4.3, the plant in recovery mode faces blocking at 
various states. We also see in that section that standard RW-based supervisory control 
solutions would depend upon the failure event to occur to come out of blocking. 
The next section presents the DES models for the users and the resources. 
5.4.2 DES Models 
















A task complete 
B task complete 
reset 
Description 
User A acquires Rl 
User A malfunctions 
User A acquires R2 
User B acquires Rl 
User B acquires R2 
User A completes the task 
User B completes the task 
User A gets reset (recovery-action event) 
Table 5.3: Event list for ARA 
The following diagram shows user A in its full mode: 
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Fig. 5.25: User A (ARA) 
Upon receiving a task assignment, user A acquires either Rl or R2. Then it acquires 
the second resource and completes the task. Once the task is completed, it goes to its 
initial state, simultaneously releasing both resources. As defined, user A is prone to 
failure (state 4) and might malfunction at any state after acquiring one resource. The 
return-to-normal event is a reset and brings user A from malfunctioning state to normal 
initial state. 
The following diagram shows the DES model for user B. User B works just like user 
A, except that by assumption, (for simplicity), it does not malfunction at any time. 
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Fig. 5.26: User B (ARA) 
The next two diagrams show resources: Rl and R2. 
5,9,15 11 9,11,15 9,15 1,11 7,9,15 
Fig. 5.27: Rl (ARA) 
11 9,11,15 
Fig. 5.28: R2 (ARA) 
3,11 
Note that the return-to-normal (reset) event (15) makes both resources available only if 
they are already acquired by user A. 
5.4.3 Plant Models 
We use TTCT [15] to compute the ARA in its full mode including the failure event and 
return-to-normal events. The following diagram shows the plant model: 
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9,15 
Fig. 5.29: Complete model of ARA (G ) 
In this model, it can be seen that at states 7 and 9, the plant observes dead blocking 
unless the failure event (2) occurs. In state 7, User A has Rl and user B has R2, hence 
deadlock, unless as a result of failure in User A, it relinquishes Rl and then User B can 
acquire Rl. A similar situation occurs in state 9 as well with User A holding R2 and 
User B holding Rl. It is not advised to depend on the failure event to come out of 
blocking. Standard RW-based supervisory control solutions assume that there is a path to 
come out of blocking. However, this path starts with a failure event. Our solution 
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considers this possibility along with possible blocking scenarios when the plant returns to 
normal mode from recovery mode. However, in this case, we do not foresee any 
blocking issues in recovery mode since we assume that the controllable return-to-normal 
event would eventually occur. 
For the purposes of understanding the dynamics of ARA, we present the plant model in 
its normal mode in the following diagram. Note that some states have been renamed to 
match the plant model. 
1,7 
Fig. 5.30: Normal mode Plant (ARA) (GN) 
We obtain the normal mode plant from the full mode plant by removing the failure 
event and return-to-normal events, and the corresponding states. 
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In this problem, the job of the supervisor is to ensure nonblocking in normal mode 
(both initially and after any return-to-normal event). Therefore all states are considered 
legal: EN = QN, ER = QR. 
5.4.4 Supervisors 
Following our algorithm presented in Chapter 4, we compute the sequence of supervisors 
VQ,V*,.... for ARA. The final robust supervisor (V^) is found as the limit of the 
sequence. Note that in the faulty (recovery) mode no nonblocking condition is enforced 
since the return-to-normal event is controllable. Also all faulty (recoveiy) states are legal 
(ER= QR). Therefore, supervisors VQ,,VV\... need not be constructed. 
The following diagram shows supervisor VQ : 
Fig. 5.31: Normal mode Supervisor: F0* 
And the following diagram shows the supervisor V[ : 
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Fig. 5.32: Recovery mode Supervisor: Fj* 
It can be easily verified that the condition for convergence is satisfied and V[ = V^. 
The automatic resource allocator (ARA) under supervision is shown in the following 
diagram: 
Fig. 5.33: ARA under supervision 
It can be seen that the plant under supervision follows 'mutual exclusion' scenario. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, three application examples are given. The first two examples that deal 
with propulsion systems have controllable return-to-normal events and the third example 
ARA has an uncontrollable return-to-normal events. It has been shown how the 
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algorithm presented in Chapter 4 provides the required supervisor, taking into account the 
plant dynamics and the nature of failure and return-to-normal events. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Future Research 
6.1 Conclusions 
In this thesis, fault recovery is studied using discrete event models. In particular, fault 
recovery when the plant is capable of returning to normal mode of operation is studied. 
A return-to-normal event is defined as an event that can bring the plant from various 
faulty modes to normal mode of operation and is defined in the faulty mode. Return-to-
normal can be either because the faults are intermittent or because the plant has the 
capacity to repair or reset. A design algorithm is presented to compute a robust 
nonblocking supervisor under above said failure conditions. 
We assume that the plant can be modeled as DES automaton and it contains finite 
number of states. We also assume that all events including the failure events are 
observable. The failure events are uncontrollable and return-to-normal events can be 
93 
either controllable or uncontrollable. The failures are assumed to be detected and isolated 
without any delay. 
The algorithm is developed using state-based approach. In our problem setup, we 
assumed that the specifications are given in form of a set of safe states. The specification 
for each failure mode is also the same and it does not depend upon the number of times 
the failure event previously occurred. Then the pre-defined safe states remain unaffected. 
This results in an easier and more transparent design for the control policies in terms of 
safe and unsafe states compared to legal and illegal event strings. We consider two cases 
of supervisory control problem, one with controllable return-to-normal (recovery-action) 
events and the second one with uncontrollable return-to-normal (recovery-correction) 
events. We have showen the resulting problems are instances of Robust Nonblocking 
Supervisory Control of countably infinite plants. We provided a procedure for 
computing maximally permissive supervisors for the fault recovery problem. 
Three illustrative examples were provided. Two of the examples belong to the 
spacecraft propulsion systems. DES theory lends itself perfectly to be used in the high 
level supervisory control of spacecraft subsystems such as propulsion systems. Both 
Simplified Propulsion System (SPS) and Extended Propulsion System (EPS) examples 
depict propulsion systems used in spacecraft. These two examples contain uncontrollable 
return-to-normal events. The Automatic Resource Allocator (ARA) represents computer 
queuing systems and contains controllable return-to-normal events. The resulting 
supervisors were also provided as DES models. 
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The problem considered in this thesis is all about plant dynamics and how these 
dynamics affect overall results expected from specific plant operations. As shown in the 
examples, all standard (non-robust) RW-based supervisory control methods fail to 
specifically address the nonblocking properties of plants under supervision after certain 
failures occur. The solutions provided by standard methods tend to have blocking issues 
when the plant moves to normal mode and start the cycle of operation again. Providing a 
robust solution that considers all the dynamics of the plant is very important in the face of 
ever growing systems and their mission criticality. Generally, DES theory is well suited 
to provide high level control in complex systems. However, DES theory developed with 
the view of internal event dynamics best provides a complete solution to achieve desired 
supervisory control. 
6.2 Future Research 
The current research can be continued in the following areas: 
• In this thesis, the supervisory control problem for fault recovery is solved 
using untimed discrete event models. This recovery framework can be 
extended to timed discrete event systems (TDES). 
• We assumed that all events are observable. In future work, either the 
failure events or return-to-normal events can be considered as 
unobservable events. This would induce transient modes into the problem. 
Then the computed supervisor must enforce safety requirements in 
transient modes too. 
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• In this thesis, only 'single failure scenarios' are considered through the 
design algorithm and examples provided. However, in general, failures 
can occur simultaneously in DES. The framework presented here can be 
extended to work for 'multiple failure scenarios.' However, this would 
make the computations very complex. A systematic way has to be found 
to deal with this problem. To that end, it would be useful to develop a 
software program to implement the design and verification so that multiple 
failure scenarios can be dealt with. 
• Only one kind of return-to-normal events is considered at a time in solving 
the examples, either controllable or uncontrollable. However, in general, a 
plant might contain a mix of controllable and uncontrollable return-to-
normal events related to different kinds of failure scenarios. Solving the 
robust nonblocking supervisory problems for these cases would be very 
challenging and computationally exhaustive. Further investigation is 
needed to implement the design algorithm for these cases. 
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